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CASE NOTES

the "claim [is] evidently fictitious in character and alleged merely to
create the jurisdictional amount. . . ,,14 Only those claims involving
an unliquidated amount that may be exaggerated so as to obtain federal
jurisdiction require the application of the "legal certainty" doctrine to
establish the legitimate value of the unliquidated damages; yet the doctrine is employed in the Horton case to determine Whether to a legal
certainty the insurance company's claim of $14,035 is in violation to the
rules of pleading. Clearly, the doctrine is only employed to resolve issues
involving factual controversies of determining damages and not controversies involving legal issues such as whether or not the Court, in determining the amount in controversy, can look to Horton's claim before
the Board, his subsequent state action, and his federal counterclaim.
Although the Court correctly interpreted 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1445 (c) prohibiting original Workmen's Compensation claims in the Federal District
Court, it broke with precedent when it placed $14,035 in controversy
by: (1) recognizing the Board's action; (2) permitting the company to
place facts in controversy that happened after the filing of the suit, and

(3) allowing the plaintiff to allege and reply to a conjectural defense
before the defendant answered the complaint. Finally, the Court apparently applied the "legal certainty" doctrine to an issue of law rather
than to a factual controversy. Subsequent to this writing rehearing has
been denied,8 5 and the departure from the well-established rule is now
law.
84

Burks v. Texas Co., 211 F. 2d 443,446 (5th Cir. 1959). (Emphasis added.)

35

30 U.S. L. WEEK 3115 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1961).

FEDERAL TAXATION-THE DETERMINATION OF WIL-.,
FULNESS IN FAILURE TO PAY TAX CASES
Defendant Goodman filed a timely federal income tax return for 1953.
He failed to pay his income tax liability for that year which he was required to pay on or before March 15, 1954. The tax due on his 1953 return was $4,457.48. Beginning in 1955, the defendant made several payments on his 1953 tax liability. Goodman's personal debts exceeded his
assets before and during the period of his tax liability. After extensive
attempts at collection by the Internal Revenue Service, that agency informed the defendant that criminal prosecution was being recommended
to the Department of Justice. Full payment of the unpaid balance of .his
income taxes for 1953, together with interest, was made by the defendant
on January 8, 1957. The defendant was indicted on January 14, 1957 for
wilful failure to pay income taxes at the time required by law.
This was the first prosecution ever brought under the "wilful failure to
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pay" provision of section 145(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,1
which is a predecessor of section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.2 Sections 145 (a) and 7203, which provide that wilful failure to pay
shall be punished as a misdemeanor, state, as follows:
Any person required .. .to pay any estimated tax or tax or required . . .to
make a return .. .who wilfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, (or)
make such return ... at the time or times required by law ... shall in addition
to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000.00 or imprisoned not more than
one year, or both, together with the costs of the prosecution.
The District Court found Goodman not guilty, holding that there was
not sufficient evidence to support a finding of wilfulness. United States v.
1961).
Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. I11.
The only other case involving an indictment brought under the misdemeanor statute for wilful failure to pay income taxes, United States v.
Palermo,3 proceeded earlier to trial and appeal, and furnishes the only
appellate court opinion concerning a wilful failure to pay prosecution.
The only essential factual difference between the two cases is that while
defendant Palermo had money available with which to pay his taxes and
also engage in luxury spending during the general period of his tax liability, Goodman was insolvent as indicated above. Palermo had filed correct
and timely tax returns for the years 1953 and 1954. He had been informed
by the Internal Revenue Service, after collection efforts had proved unsuccessful, that criminal prosecution was being recommended. Palermo paid
his taxes in full, together with interest and estimated tax penalties, prior
to the return of a two count indictment charging wilful failure to pay
income taxes for the calendar years 1953 and 1954. He was found guilty
and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred dollars on each count.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
conviction of Palermo for wilful failure to pay income taxes due for the
year 1953, ruling that there was insufficient evidence of "wilfulness" to
sustain the conviction and ordered that a judgment of acquittal be entered
by the trial court. Palermo's conviction for wilful failure to pay income
taxes due for the year 1954 was also reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court with instructions that a new trial be granted. 4 To date,
Palermo has not been retried.
Although, as indicated above, failure to make estimated tax payments
is also punishable as a misdemeanor under the statute, Goodman and
Palermo were not indicted for such an offense.
126 U.S.C.A. 145(a) (Supp. 1939).
226

U.S.C.A. 7203 (Supp. 1960).

3 259 F.2d 872 (3rd Cir. 1958).
4

Ibid.
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In commenting on the elements required to prove a wilful failure to
pay income taxes, the court, in Goodman, cited the Palermo decision
when it noted that wilfulness, being an essential element of such a crime,
requires the existence of a specific wrongful intent, i.e., evil motive, at the
time the crime is committed. The court indicated that a series of defaults
in payments, knowingly and intentionally made, which could be indicative of a pattern of behavior, might suggest the existence of an "evil
motive." However, the court pointed out that "mere laxity, careless
disregard of the duty imposed by law, or even gross negligence, unattended by 'evil motive' are not probative of 'wilfulness.' ",
The meaning of wilfulness has been considered by the Supreme Court
in United States v. Murdock.6 Murdock had been convicted by a District
Court under section 114(a) of the Revenue Act of 1926, a predecessor
of section 145(a), for wilfully refusing to give testimony and supply
information concerning deductions claimed on his 1927 and 1928 income
tax returns for moneys paid to others. The conviction was reversed by a
Circuit Court 7 and certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. 8

The Court, in explaining the meaning of wilful commented that the
word often denotes an intentional, as distinguished from accidental or
unknowing, act. For the purpose of a criminal statute, the Court provided
alternative definitions of wilful when it stated that the general meanings
of the word are: "[ain act done with a bad purpose . . . (or) without
justifiable excuse . . . (or) stubbornly, obstinately, perversely . . . (or)
a thing done without ground for believing it is lawful . . . (or) conduct

marked by careless disregard whether or not one has the right so to act."9
As a means of better defining wilful, in the context of the fact situation
in Murdock, the various other omissions which were deemed wilful under
section 114(a) were discussed. Insofar as wilful failure to pay a tax is
concerned, the Court remarked that though such conduct is criminal,
Congress did not intend that a taxpayer, through an honest misunderstanding as to his tax liability, should be held a criminal by merely failing to
measure up to a statutory standard of conduct.
Although Goodman and Palermo are the only prosecutions for wilful
failure to pay income taxes under the misdemeanor statute, the Supreme
Court commented at some length on the subject in Spies v. UnitedStates.10
5Ibid.
6 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
7
8

Murdock v. United States, 62 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1932).
United States v. Murdock, 290 US. 606 (1933).

9 United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 289, 394-95 (1933).
10 317 US. 492 (1943).
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Spies had been .convicted under the felony statute, section 145.(b), 11 for
wilfully attempting to evade and defeat his income tax. The government
contended that Spies had wilfully failed to file a. return or pay his tax in
order to accomplish a felonious purpose. The conviction was reversed.
The Court compared the offenses of wilful failure to file income .tax
returns and wilful nonpayment of taxes and noted that .a voluntary and
intentional failure to file an income tax return might be. a wilful act. But
in dealing with the meaning of wilful in a prosection for wilful failure
to pay income taxes, the Court took notice of our traditional aversion to
imprisonment. of debtors and said that without a -precise expression of
legislative, intent, an. intentional default in payment of taxes,. of itself,
where the taxpayer had -not wilfully failed to, disclose his liability, would
not constitute a criminal offense. To constitute wilfulness in such a situation there must be "some element of evil motive, and want of justification
'12
in view of all the financial circumstances of the taxpayer.'
There is authority for the limitation, by the courts in Goodman and
Palermo, of the alternative. definitions of wilfulness in Murdock. Appellate
court opinions with respect to prosecutions for other criminal violations
of the Internal Revenue Code, whether under the misdemeanor statute or
the felony statute, have consistently limited the application of -the
Murdock decision.
As indicated previously,. "bad purpose" was-included in Murdock13 as
a definition of wilfulness.. United States v. Martell14 limited the use of this
phrase in regard to wilfulness. Martell had been convicted of tax evasion
under the felony. statute. The trial judge had -instructed the jury that
filing of a false return for perspnal gain was a, bad purpose which provided
the requisite. degree of wilfulness. The conviction was reversed. To illustrate the imprecise meaning of the phrase, the Appellate Court raised the
hypothetical question of whether good purpose would be demonstrated
by ..failing to pay income -taxes in order, to pay needed expenses of a
dependent while bad purpose would -result from a failure to pay taxes
so as to use the money to engage in gambling.
In Bloch v. United States,'5. which was decided subsequent to Martell,
11 Section 145 (b) of the 1939 Code and section 7201, its successor under the 1954
Code, -provide in part that "(A)ny person who wilfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any tax ...or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalies
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not
more than $10,000.00, or imprisoned for not more than five years or both, together
with the costs of prosecution."
12 United States v. Spies, 317 U.S. 492, 498 (1943). "
13 United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).

14 199 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 97 (1952).
15 221

F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1955).
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15

the-defendant was -convicted under -the felony statute. The trial court had
instructed the jury that wilfulness, included the doing of an act with a
bad :purpose. In reversing the .conviction, bad purpose was revived as a
definition but given a narrow construction when the court held that
"[t]he::bad purpose must be to evade or defeat the payment of the income
tax.that .is due."' 6

: Yarboroughv. United States'7 and Haskell v. United States' involved
prosecutions for failure to file income tax returns under the misdemeanor
statute. The court in Haskell, in commenting on bad purpose quoted the
earlier Yarborough decision:
. "[T]he only 'bad purpose or bad motive, which it is necessary
. .. to prove
S.. :is the deliberate intention not to file returns which the defendant knew
ought to havebeen filed, so that the Government would not know the extent
of... 'liability."'19
S::Gross negligence, which was noted in Murdock as being definitive of
wilfulness -has been held insufficient to constitute wilfulness in prosecutions for tax evasion under 'the felony statuteg° and failure. to file under
21
the misdemeanor statute.
'From an analysis of the cases discussed, an authoritative definition of
wilfulness with respect to 'failure to pay income taxes cannot be given.
However, the :Internal Revenue Service will presumably employ, in investigations .of cases-"of alleged wilful failure to pay taxes, substantially the
same investigative procedures and devices used in wilful failure to file and
tax evasion'cases. In order to anticipate the means by which evidence of
wilfulness will be 'established in a failure to pay situation, consideration
should be given :to these investigative ,techniques.
.. The general rule is that on prosecution for a particular crime, when the
guilt of a party depends upon the intent with which an act was done,
evidence of other similar'acts and' conduct by.the 'same person at or near
the time of'the.crime charged or ,connected with the same subject matter
is admissible to establish wifiklness. 22 Therefore, evidence concerning the
execution and filing of proper .returns on time and the payment or failure
16 Id. at 789.
17 230 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1956).

18.241 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1957).
1.9Haskell v. United States, 241 F.2d 790,794 (7th Cir. 1957).
20
21

United States v. Glascott, 216 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1954).
Litman v. United States, 246 F.2d 209 (3rd Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 869

(1957)..

.

..

Brickey v. United States, 123 F.2d 344 (8th Cir. 1941); United States v. Bridell,
180F. Supp. 273 (ND. IM.1960); Malone v. United-States, 94 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1938),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 562 (1938).
22

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

to pay taxes in years prior to the tax years in question is admissible to
show that a taxpayer clearly knew his income tax was due, when it was
due and that taxes were to be paid in conformity with such returns in
order to establish or negate the defense of innocent intent.
Proof of such extra indictment transactions need not show or indicate
that they involved criminality. 23 A defendant's previous delinquencies and
their motives may therefore be considered relative to the question of
intent prior to a determination that the indictment delinquency was illmotivated.
Investigations concerning allegations relative to wilful failure to pay
income taxes are conducted by Special Agents of the Internal Revenue
Service's Intelligence Division. 24 This division makes recommendations as
to the disposition of cases investigated. The Special Agents have available
data relative to the subject of the investigation maintained in the files of
the Internal Revenue Service such as, for example, prior income tax returns
and records pertaining to payments and examinations or investigations
which have been made with respect to such returns. In the course of such
investigations, an analysis of the taxpayer's bank records will be made and
third parties with whom the taxpayer did business, such as the preparer
of his income tax returns, will be interviewed.
The use of evidence concerning payment of taxes, in years prior to the
years for which wilful failure to pay is charged, has been referred to as
the "tax assessment method. ' 25 The Internal Revenue Service maintains
a permanent record of pertinent tax assessment information. The relevant
data, for a particular year, is transmitted on Internal Revenue Service
Form 899, Certificate of Assessments and Payments, and contains such
information as class of tax, taxable period, account number, and amounts
assessed and paid.
A taxpayer's knowledge concerning his income taxes in extra indictment
years, while he was earning the income upon which a tax liability was
attaching, is admissible in evidence on the issue of wilfulness, as previously
shown. Therefore, evidence that he spent sums up to and beyond his
reported income in disregard of his tax responsibility during the years for
which he is charged with wilful failure to pay income taxes is also admissible to establish wilfulness.
A binding definition of wilfulness will be determined in the course of
future decisions involving wilful failure to pay income taxes. It is submitted
23

24

Ibid.
See, Murphy, The Investigative Procedure For Criminal Tax Evasion, 27

FoRw-

HAM L. R v. 48 (1958).
25

See, Greenside, The Importance Of The Original Tax Return In Civil Fraud

Cases, 36 TAXEs 322 (1958).
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that the courts will continue to reject the alternative definitions in Murdock
and instead adhere to the standard set forth in Goodman and Palermo,
i.e., that a specific wrongful intent not to pay income taxes must be established.
REAL PROPERTY-REDEMPTION RIGHTS
OF STRANGER TO RECORD TITLE
Smith, highest bidder on certain real estate at a tax foreclosure sale and
to whom a certificate of purchase was issued, petitioned the circuit court
of Cook county to expunge the record of an attempted redemption by
one Lyons, undisclosed agent for Western National Bank of Cicero as
trustee, on the grounds that Lyons had no redeemable interest. The court
granted the petition and entered an order finding that Smith was the
purchaser at the tax sale and that Lyons had no interest entitling him to
redeem. Western National Bank then made a motion to vacate the order.
It attempted to show that it had actual title to the property through
various mesne conveyances, and therefore had an interest which would
entitle it to redeem. The circuit court denied the motion and an appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of Illinois' which held that Western
National Bank was precluded from redeeming because one of the deeds
in its chain of title was not recorded. Weiner v. Jobst, 22 Ill. 2d 11, 174
N.E. 2d 561 (1961).

An important part of real estate taxation is the body politic's authority
to divest an owner of his property and sell it at a tax redemption sale. 2 The
right of redemption from such sales is protected by the Illinois Constitution which provides:
The right of redemption from all sales of real estate, for the non-payment of

taxes or special assessments of any character, whatever, shall exist in favor of
owners and persons interested in such
real estate, for a period of not less than
3
two years from such sales thereof.
Furthermore, Illinois redemption statutes repeatedly refer to the rights of

"owners" and "persons interested" to redeem. Often these "persons inter'4
ested" are referred to as "unknown owners."
1 Jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is invoked pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
S 75 (1959) which provides in part that: "Appeals shall be taken directly to the Supreme

Court (a) in all cases in which a franchise or freehold ...is involved ....
"
2 For an excellent discussion on the whole problem of state taxation and redemptions in Illinois see Corby, Developments in Real Estate Taxation-1950-1960, 10
DE PAULL. REV. 596 (1961).
3

ILL. CoNsT. art IX,

§5. (Emphasis added,)

4 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,

§5 697-752 (1959).

